The rapid-fire unrolling of a US House of Representatives bill that would force TikTok to sell or face an onshore ban in the United States last week left little time to digest the relevant portions of what might happen next. The bill, from a purely politick perspective, passed committee with a 50-0 vote; a unanimous vote almost unprecedented in recent memory. Moreover, it saw the more left-wing and right-wing legislators in their respective parties agreeing with one another on opposing the bill (the anti-anti-TikTok coalition). Alexander Ocasio-Cortex (D – NY-14) will voted alongside Marjorie Taylor-Greene (R – GA-14) in opposing the bill while Republican soon-to-be presidential nominee Donald Trump is voicing his support for TikTok.

Although each legislator who has voiced opposition has different political reasons for opposition, the actual bill’s timing and staging has opened many policy doors. Although the bill has yet to pass the senate – and faces significant opposition from Senator Rand Paul (R – KY) who has suggested he will use committees to halt the progression of the bill – its momentum is historic. Each stage the bill reaches opens new questions about the United States’ domestic and foreign policy. Thus, instead of trying to predict what might happen next, there are three questions the ‘TikTok ban bill’ has opened that expand beyond just this moment-in-time.

Why try to ban TikTok now?

In December 2023, Rutgers University released a comprehensive study on TikTok moderation relating to topics that support or criticise key points of the Chinese Communist Party’s objectives. Not necessarily surprising, the results of a hashtag and trend analysis suggested that moderation – the boosting and removal of content – falls within ranges which align with the CCP’s messaging. As a global example, in Taiwan, TikTok is overwhelmingly popular within the age range of 9-25 and has resulted in younger children (under 18) utilising words and phrases commonly found within Mainland Mandarin, and not necessarily the unique Taiwanese Mandarin that has evolved over the past three decades. That TikTok benefits the CCP’s global initiatives is not new knowledge, but studies are beneficial to confirming ancillary observations and comments.

The major question, however, is why now? Was new intelligence found? Is the intention to incentivise the parent company ByteDance to sell the app? If new intelligence on a threat was found, then a leak in one of the leading Washington D.C. Newspapers might suggest what that threat is to propel the US Senate to speed the bill along. If the intention was to strongly suggest ByteDance to sell the app, then the US Congress is risking setting up enormous precedent when there are diplomatic paths open.

The answer is likely a mix of backroom politics on Capitol Hill rather than spies or disinformation. These policy pushes can float around for some time in classified drafts before moving forward to the committee. The timing also probably involves the upcoming November election – any later push to ‘Ban TikTok’ probably hurts incumbent candidates as the optics would be an attack on a potential campaign platform. Now is the last chance before 2025 to make a TikTok ban push.

What about Courts and Freedom of Speech in the US?

The US and the first amendment of the constitution – freedom of speech – is the entire key for the bill if TikTok challenges it in courts. In the US, there are generally two methods in which a law could violate the first amendment: 1) The chilling effect; 2) Explicit limiting of speech. The chilling effect is not necessarily of concern here as this occurs when a law or regulation would, or does, lead to individual persons in the US limiting expression due to fear of violating the law or regulation. Judges usually cite the chilling effect to strike down overly broad laws. The latter, explicit limiting speech, is the key question here.

In December 2023 a US judge struck down a Montana state law that would ban the app within the IP configuration of the state. Aside from being difficult to enforce, the judge ruled that Montana’s legislators wrote the bill in a way that would establish foreign policy for the US, and a state does not have the right to articulate foreign policy for the US. This precedent is unlikely to apply to the current Congressional bill as the US Congress does have the power to dictate foreign policy. However, the questions open are: 1) Does the US Congress have the power to force the sale of a product to allow operation within US borders and; 2) Does limiting a social media app violate the first amendment?

The first answer is: yes (commerce clause). The second answer, and the more relevant factor if ByteDance refuses to divest from TikTok in the US and challenges the bill in courts, is probably. The way in which the US Supreme Court interprets the law, however is the single most important question for US persons as it could set unprecedented laws about what form social and internet speech take within the first amendment. Still, TikTok is likely to obtain a favourable ruling in a conservative leaning Supreme Court that will be careful to establish any new precedent concerning free speech. However, would punting on establishing precedent – essentially, a ruling that would strike down the law, but not define what the specific violation of free speech is – risks opening a political and legal conundrum for the US that could occupy the next several decades of US legal theory.

Where do CCP disinformation campaigns head now?

The CCP has done two things in the past week relevant here: 1) criticised the US for censorship in a statement shrouded in layers of irony and 2) remained silent on plans for TikTok. Like all social media apps, the CCP and general purveyors of disinformation – foreign and domestic to the US – utilise TikTok to push disinformation campaigns. Although it appears the CCP receives additional benefits from TikTok, there is not necessarily hard evidence the CCP has a net benefit from any campaigns it runs on TikTok. The Rutgers study only assessed the content and messaging effect, not the beliefs and actions of responders. It is not hard to imagine the correlation would result in CCP messaging receiving a net benefit from TikTok, and ancillary evidence suggests so. But how useful is TikTok compared to other social media apps and more traditional – e.g., fake newspapers – methods?

Or maybe, how useful was TikTok under previous scrutiny? If the bill does not pass, the CCP could utilise influencers to boost the effect of TikTok by creating a campaign that suggests to its power users – often younger voters – something along the lines of ‘US leadership cannot be trusted’. And these younger voters are exactly the demographic which incumbent President Joe Biden needs to retain the presidency in November.

While the US could also begin to highlight the exact national security concerns around TikTok and conducting large scale studies, instead of the more ambiguous nature of claims which rely on strong, although anecdotal, evidence, to undermine CCP influence on TikTok. In fact, this policy initiative might be better for addressing the underlying causes of which TikTok disinformation is a symptom.

Regardless of the functional policies which impact TikTok’s business holdings, disinformation will persist on the platform, either from the CCP, Russia, or Iran. The next step, which may matter more, will involve what the US does to combat increased disinformation campaigns, regardless of their origin.